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Constructing Outraged
Communities and State Responses:
The Taslima Nasreen Saga in 1994
and 2007
Ali Riaz
‘I do not want any more twists to my tale of woes.
Please do not give political colour (sic) to my
plight. I do not want to be a victim of politics. And
I do not want anybody to do politics with me.’
Taslima Nasreen (2007) Hindustan Times, November
27.
1 Taslima Nasreen, the exiled Bangladeshi author, once again attracted the attention of the
international media as a result of events in India beginning in August 2007. The physical
attack on her at a book launch in Hyderabad was followed by riots in Kolkata, the capital
of  the  state  of  West  Bengal,  in  November  2007.  Nasreen  was then  forced  by  the
government to leave the city she called her second home and was shunted from one city
to another. She was kept under security protection for months in undisclosed locations.
Finally, in mid-March 2008, after 110 days in the ‘safe custody’ of the Indian government
Nasreen left India for Europe.1
2 These  events  were  reminiscent  of  the  events  of  1994  which  led  to  her  exile  from
Bangladesh. At that time, she not only became the target of the ‘religious zealots’ who
demanded that she be killed for heresy but was also charged with blasphemy in a court.
After 44 days of hiding she was given a ‘safe passage’, thanks to the intervention of the
international  community.  Her detractors claimed that she had offended the religious
sensitivities of the Muslim ‘community’. In 2007, the organization of the attack and the
agitation was claimed by Indian ‘Muslim groups’ which insist that one volume of her
autobiography  (published  4  years  ago)  and  her  other  writings have  offended  their
religious sentiments.
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3 The uncanny similarities of these two series of events and the responses of the authorities
in Bangladesh and India  deserve close  scrutiny at  various  levels.  Interestingly,  these
events (i.e., the 1994 agitation in Bangladesh and the 2007 violence in Kolkata), took place
in the background when other outraged communities, based on larger political demands,
were in the making.
4 In this paper I analyze the events on the ground and the responses of the states. I argue
that these events demonstrate how ‘outraged communities’ are constructed, and symbols
are invented to mobilize the community. These events also demonstrate, among other
issues, how states in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh and India, deal with ‘outraged
communities’;  and what,  if  any,  role  states  play  in the construction of  the outraged
community. The paper’s focus on the ‘state response’ is not to suggest the primacy of the
state in these issues; instead the dynamics within the groups of non-state actors and how
the outrage is framed are important in understanding the trajectories of the events. But
the state’s role has received little attention in the extant discussions while I contend that
states bear a significant responsibility in engendering the controversy. The banning of
the book is a case in point. In Bangladesh Nasreen’s book Lajja (Shame) was proscribed in
mid-1993 before the agitations against the author ensued; similarly, in West Bengal, her
book Dwikhondito (Split  in Halves)  was banned in 2004,  three years  before the street
agitations gripped the state capital Kolkata. The paper, therefore, intends to address the
absence of the discussions on states’ roles.
5 Four sections follow this introduction; the events of 1997 and 2007-08 are described in the
first and the second sections. The third section presents the analysis drawing on both
events and their significance in understanding the complexity of the politics of emotion.
Concluding thoughts comprise the final section.
 
Episode 1: Bangladesh, 1994
6 The sixty-day episode of turmoil and mayhem and the eventual exile of Taslima Nasreen
from Bangladesh took place between 4 June and 4 August 1994, but this was in the making
from the beginning of 1993. An author, a columnist and a medical doctor by profession,
Nasreen was known only to the middle class literate population until the government
confiscated  her  passport  on  23  January  1993  allegedly  for  traveling  under  a  ‘false
identity’. Although providing a false identity is a misdemeanor according to the laws of
Bangladesh,  and as  a  public  official  she could have been subjected to  administrative
disciplinary measures, the government took no further action against her. This, however,
was not an indication of leniency towards Nasreen, but the usual bureaucratic way of
dealing with such issues  in Bangladesh;  that  is  to  do something without  getting too
involved in ‘trifling matters’. The government’s action was caused in part by Nasreen’s
high-profile  trips  to India since she had won a coveted literary prize in Kolkata the
previous year. The government headed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which
champions anti-India feelings, was also trying to send a signal that it was not thrilled to
see such intimacy with the West Bengal literary community.2
7 By  the  middle  of  the  year,  there  was  a  conspicuous  change  in  the  attitude  of  the
government: on 10 July 1993 Nasreen’s novel Lajja (Shame) was proscribed. The book,
published in February 1993, became an instant best-seller and by July more than sixty
thousand copies had been sold,  a major success by Bangladeshi  standards.  The book,
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depicting the agony of a Hindu family during the communal riots in Bangladesh after the
demolition  of  the  Babri  Mosque  (6  December  1992)  in  India,  stirred  debate  among
Bangladeshi intellectuals;  but nobody expected the book to be banned, because there
were no precedents to draw upon in regard to fictional works. The government action
came on the heels of a move by a small religious group from the northeastern town of
Sylhet.
8 The  previously  unknown  ‘religious’  group  named  Shahaba  Sainik  Parishad  (later
discovered  to  have  a  large  following  and  suspected  of  connections  with  a  group  in
Pakistan) from Sylhet—a city northeast of Dhaka—issued a fatwa sentencing her to death
and placing a reward of taka 50,000 (approximately 250 US dollars) on her head on 23
September 1993. The group retracted its statement after severe criticism from various
sectors of society. However, it continued to demand the banning of all her books and that
she be put on trial on charges of ‘blasphemy’. Two cases were lodged in the local courts of
a northeastern city by two individuals, presumably members of the aforementioned
group, alleging that Nasreen’s writings had offended their religious sentiments. After a
preliminary hearing in which Nasreen was represented by her attorney, these cases were
shelved. Nasreen also filed a suit against one Maulana Habibur Rahman and six others
who were leading the campaign against her. Nasreen complained that they incited people
in a public meeting in Sylhet against her, that a death threat had been made in the said
meeting, and that she was at risk because of the threat.
9 While a pseudo court battle was going on in Sylhet, the group that called for the banning
of  Nasreen’s  books  continued  its  agitation  and  organized  several  demonstrations—
initially outside Dhaka, but later in the capital. In November, the group called a general
strike in Sylhet. Shahaba Sainik Parishad’s (SSP) demonstrations began to draw a large
crowd.  Most  of  the  participants,  according to  eyewitness  accounts,  were  students  of
madrassahs and activists of religiopolitical parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami [JI]. The
JI initially claimed that it had no hand in this fatwa, but gradually it became clear that the
demonstrations were manned by JI activists as the SSP had little or no support and little
organizational capacity to mobilize the masses.
10 After  declaring  a  bounty  on  her  head  militants  intensified  their  campaign  against
Nasreen. She herself ‘appealed via fax and phone to the Western media and human rights
groups’  (Wright  1995:  4)  to  put  pressure  on  the  government  to  ensure  her  safety.
Consequently,  a  number  of  international  human rights  groups  asked the  Bangladesh
government to guarantee her safety,  and international  writers’  associations began to
unfurl their flags in support of Nasreen.
11 The situation took a dramatic turn at the beginning of June 1994. In May, soon after
receiving a new passport, Nasreen left for Paris. On her way back from Paris, she visited
Kolkata and was interviewed by the Indian English-language daily the Statesman. In her 9
May 1994 interview, she reportedly said that the Quran was written by a human being.
Nasreen, according to the report, also said that she was against any partial changes in the
Quran, implying that she wanted a total revision of the Quran. In a rejoinder published on
11 May 1994, Nasreen denied that she made any such remarks.
12 Both the interview and the rejoinder remained unknown to Bangladeshi readers until a
government-owned English daily in Dhaka reprinted the interview in early June, without
the necessary permission from the Statesman and without Nasreen’s rejoinder. The reason
the story was reprinted became obvious within a week. The government lodged a case
against her under Section 295A of the Penal Code, which stipulates that a person must
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serve two years in jail for offending religious sentiments. The court issued a warrant for
Nasreen’s arrest on 4 June 1994. She then went into hiding.
13 Meanwhile, some thirteen Islamist parties, factions, and organizations formed an alliance
to put pressure on the government to arrest Nasreen, waged a campaign against almost
all secular intellectuals, attacked the offices of newspapers that showed even the slightest
sympathy  for  Nasreen  or  had  criticized  religious  groups  on  previous  occasions,  and
ransacked bookstores selling Nasreen’s books.3
14 Behind the scenes, negotiations took place in New York between Bangladeshi authorities
and PEN’s Women Writers’ Committee, which pressured the Bangladesh government to
allow Nasreen to leave the country. Finally, a face-saving formula was worked out. After
receiving assurances that she would not be incarcerated,  Nasreen surrendered to the
court on 3 August 1994, represented by a pool of qualified lawyers, including a former
foreign minister.  The court  granted bail.  Within a  week,  she  left  for  Sweden ‘on an
invitation from a Swedish writers association’.
15 The above narrative of the events on the ground, especially the street agitation provides
an impression that  the government was responding to the demands of  the outraged
community/groups hurt by Nasreen’s comments. But it also raises questions as to why
the ‘outrage’ was expressed at that time, especially involving a book published more than
a  year  before.  Equally  important  is  the  question:  were  the  street  mobilizations
spontaneous? Anyone familiar  with Bangladeshi  politics  and those who observed the
demonstrations would respond negatively. Evidently, organized political forces, Islamists
of various shades to be precise, with a specific agenda were at the forefront of these
agitations. The prevailing impasse in domestic politics and different hidden agendas of
the political actors of Bangladesh created the imbroglio. Before going into details, let me
point out once again that Nasreen’s interview, which served as a stirring prelude to a
drama that lasted for exactly sixty days, was published on 9 May but remained unknown
to  Bangladeshis  until  a  government-owned  newspaper  reprinted  and  highlighted  it.
There  are  reasons  to  suspect  that  it  was  reprinted  only  to  create  an  environment
conducive to filing a case against her.
16 In May 1994, four features of Bangladesh politics stood out: first, the opposition political
parties,  which  had  been  boycotting  the  Parliament  for  more  than  two  months,
demonstrated  their  firm  determination  not  to  return  to  the  house;  second,  and  a
corollary to the first feature, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the relationship
between the Jamaat-i-Islami and the ruling BNP had become strained, and consequently a
new long-term alliance between the Awami League (AL) and the Jamaat-i-Islami was in
the  offing;  third,  a  verdict  was  forthcoming  on  the  eighteen-month-long  troubled
citizenship trial of Golam Azam, the ameer (chief) of the Jamaat; and fourth, the Jamaat
was  looking  for  an  opportunity  to  bring  its  proposed  blasphemy  law  into  public
discussion. Interestingly, none of this was happy news for the ruling party, and all of it
involved the Jamaat-i-Islami.
17 On 1st March 1994, opposition political parties led by the Awami League began to agitate
for a constitutional amendment that would allow the holding of future elections under a
caretaker government instead of under the ruling government. In a not-so-surprising
move, the Awami League formed an alliance with the Jamaat-i-Islami, an old-time friend
of the ruling party. The opposition’s boycott of Parliament began like a usual walkout, but
soon it became clear that the opposition was trying to hold on to its demand to amend the
constitution to hold all future elections under a nonpartisan caretaker government. The
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opposition threatened that it would continue to boycott parliamentary sessions unless
the ruling party bowed to its demand. Opposition parties engaged in a series of agitation
programs. Although the public at large was in a state of confusion with regard to the
demand raised by the opposition parties, the immediate reaction of the press was in favor
of  the  demand,  which  the  ruling party  mistook  for  popular  support.  But  the
confrontational  mood of  the opposition was  not  welcomed by a  large section of  the
population, especially the business community. The ruling party’s initial posture was to
disregard the issue altogether. But by May 1994 the BNP became visibly frightened as its
support fell rapidly. What concerned the ruling party most was the emerging alliance
between the Awami League and the Jamaat-i-Islami. The former had always been a rival of
the ruling party, but the latter provided support for the ruling party whenever it was
necessary. In fact, the BNP had come to power with the help of the Jamaat, whose twenty
MPs extended their whole-hearted support to the BNP in forming the government in
1991. Ostensibly, Jamaat was now deserting the BNP.
18 For the BNP, this situation called for immediate action to diffuse the brewing tension and
reestablish the old order. For the ruling party, two goals had to be achieved: first, to
divert public attention from the opposition’s demand; second, to create a division within
the emerging alliance. Nasreen’s interview provided the ruling party with an issue that
had the potential to help achieve both these goals. An issue pertaining to religion was
sensitive enough to arouse concern, while at the same time, members of the emerging
alliance—because  of  their  different  ideological  orientations—were  destined  to  take
different stands, rendering the alliance practically ineffective. Both politics and tricks
played their roles. The ruling party’s strategy to divide the opposition alliance did not
work as well as expected. Contrary to the expectation of the BNP and the general masses,
the Awami League distanced itself from the issue, allowing the Jamaat to run the show.
The Awami League was more interested in pursuing a closer relationship with the Jamaat
than  with  fighting  a  battle  for  a  secularist  cause.  In  the  name  of  a  combined
parliamentary opposition, the AL was working with the Jamaat and intended to intensify
the street agitation programs. The Jamaat,  at an early stage of the crisis,  kept a low
profile. But perhaps because of the Awami League’s inaction, the Jamaat soon joined the
anti-Nasreen  agitation.  Therefore,  the  split  that  the  ruling  party  expected  did  not
materialize. The Islamists outside the ambit of the Jamaat-i-Islami, especially the militant
organizations, soon forged an alliance called Sammilita Sangram Parishad (Alliance for
United Movement).
19 The Jamaat had two agendas: firstly, to divert public attention from the citizenship trial
of Golam Azam;4 and secondly, to highlight the proposed ‘Blasphemy law’.
20 The hearing concerning Golam Azam’s case in the Supreme Court began on 4 May 1994,
and from the beginning it  was evident that the process would not take a long time,
meaning a verdict might be forthcoming. In the meantime, the anti-Azam movement
turned into a movement against those who had actively collaborated with the occupation
regime in 1971. The organizers set up a Public Inquiry Commission to collect evidence
against a number of collaborators, most of whom were the current leaders of the Jamaat.
The initial enthusiasm and fervor of the movement subsided, but it did not lose all its
steam. It was expected that a verdict in favor of Azam might steer the movement to a new
phase. Hence the Jamaat wanted to create a situation in which the issue of Golam Azam
would become of secondary in importance and the movement against him would face an
uphill battle to prove its worth. Their hopes came to fruition when the Supreme Court
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delivered its judgment on 22 June 1994, in favor of restoring Golam Azam’s citizenship as
a Bangladeshi.
21 The  restoration  of Golam Azam’s  citizenship  through  a  court  verdict  frustrated  the
opponents, but gave Jamaat the opportunity it was looking for to bring a specific issue to
the fore: the proposed blasphemy law. The bill was proposed in 1992 and tabled in 1993,
but discussion continued within the confines of the Parliament building. In 1994, owing to
the fact that the opposition members of the Parliament were engaged in a boycott, the
Jamaat aimed to bring up the issue through some other means.
22 Nasreen’s comments in the Indian newspaper the Statesman on 9 May provided the Jamaat
with the opportunity it was looking for. As soon as her comments were made known,
Islamists in general and the Jamaat in particular argued that the article proved the need
for a blasphemy law. The statement issued by some 101 pro-Jamaat intellectuals on 1
June; the statement of Matiur Rahman Nizami,  the secretary general of the Jamaat-i-
Islami, on the Nasreen issue on 8 June; and numerous articles in the daily Inquilab and the
daily Sangram, both mouthpieces of the Islamists, insisted that the situation would not
have arisen if there had been a blasphemy law. Other newspapers joined the fray (e.g. New
Nation 1994: 5)
23 The JI had attempted to table a Blasphemy Law, akin to the law passed and implemented
in Pakistan, in 1992, but had not succeeded.5 Learning from their limited success in 1992,
the Islamists, and the Jamaat in particular, did not rely on one single case to prove their
point.  Instead,  to  intensify  their  campaign,  they  also  targeted  a  Bengali  daily,  the
Janakantha,  which since the beginning of the year had relentlessly tried to expose the
persons involved in and the factors behind the ubiquitous rise of fatwabaz (those who
decree an edict) in the country. In an editorial in the 12 May 1994, issue, the Janakantha
showed how orthodox and illiterate mullahs were misinterpreting the Quran and the
Hadith.  The  Islamists  alleged  that  this  specific  article  had  offended  the  religious
sentiments of the Muslim community and called upon the government to bring charges
against its editor. The government picked up the issue and filed a case against the editor
(Atiqullah Khan Masud), the advisory editor (Toab Khan), the executive editor (Borhan
Ahmed), and an assistant editor (Shamsuddin Ahmed) of the newspaper under Section
295A of the Penal Code.
24 It was the first time since independence that a newspaper had been charged under this
clause. Ironically, during the twenty-four years of Pakistani rule, when the cry of ‘Islam in
danger’ was all too familiar, no newspaper had ever faced a charge under this clause; but
it happened in Bangladesh, which had once proclaimed secularism as its guiding state
principle. Both the advisory editor and the executive editor were arrested on 8 June 1994.
They  appeared  before  the  court  on  the  same afternoon,  and  their  bail  petition  was
denied. Accordingly, they were sent to jail. The assistant editor surrendered to the court
later and faced the same fate. Eight days later, Masud was granted bail by the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court. Borhan Ahmed and Toab Khan were granted bail on 15
and 20 June, respectively (Ahmed 1995). But all of this was overshadowed by the Nasreen
saga  and  received  little  attention  outside  Bangladesh.  Bangladeshi  secularists,
unfortunately,  failed to highlight the issue altogether.  The street  agitation continued
until she left the country in August6. The state machinery not only allowed these violent
demonstrations to continue and death threats to be waged against the author, but also
prioritized the issue of dealing with the offenses related to hurting religious sentiments
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over the demand for trials  of  Golam Azam and others for their involvements in war
crimes.
25 Thus,  the  first  grassroots  movement  against  the  Islamists,  particularly  the  Jamaat-i-
Islami,  since  their  resurgence in  1979 was  dissipated—not  by clamping down on the
movement  but  through  constructing  a  diversion  and  by  cultivating  an  outraged
community.
 
Episode 2: India, 2007
26 The heightened media coverage of the second episode of the Nasreen saga began with the
attack on her at Hyderabad on 9 August 2007. During a book launch at the city’s press
club Nasreen was attacked by ‘an unruly crowd’ (NDTV 2007) under the leadership of
three state assembly members of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM). The
party  chief  extended  his  wholehearted  support  to  the  attack  and  threatened  to  kill
Nasreen  himself  (IANS  2007).  A  small  local  group,  named  Dasgah-e-Jehad-Shaheed,
claiming itself  the representative of the Muslim community,  held a demonstration in
Hyderabad on 11 August where it demanded that the author be expelled from India. By
then Nasreen returned to Kolkata where she had been living for almost 3 years. The Imam
of a local mosque, Syed Noor-ur-Rahman Barkati, issued a death threat against Nasreen
on 17 August:  ‘Anybody eliminating her would be given 100,000 rupies and unlimited
rewards  if  she  does  not  leave  the  country  immediately.  She  has  insulted  Islam and
continued  to  create  problem  in  this  country’  Maulana  Barkati  told  reporters
(WebIndia123 2007; Hindustan Times 2007).
27 After more than three months of  calm,  the issue re-emerged in violent form on the
streets of Kolkata on 21 November 2007: the All-India Minority Forum’s demonstration
demanding that Taslima Nasreen’s Indian visa be revoked and that she be forced to leave
the country turned into a city-wide riot (BBCNews 2007). The scale of violence, not seen in
Kolkata for decades, gripped the city for a day. The West Bengal government immediately
put pressure on her to leave the state,7 within hours she was forced by law enforcing
agencies to move to Jaipur. She was then thrown out of the state of Maharashtra towards
Delhi,  where she was put  in an undisclosed safe house under the supervision of  the
central government. The cabinet ministers of the central government allegedly pressured
her to make a public apology. The Foreign Minister commented that India would continue
to  provide  her  ‘shelter’  as  a  guest  but  she  would  have  to  show  restraint.  Pranab
Mukherjee told the Indian Parliament on 28 November 2007, that ‘It is also expected that
the guests will refrain from activities and expressions that may hurt the sentiments of
our people’ (AOL News 2007).
28 On the same day, Taslima Nasreen informed her publisher in Kolkata to delete sections of
the  second  part  of  her  autobiography  published  in  2002.  Announcing  her  decision
Nasreen told the press, ‘I have withdrawn some parts of my book Dwikhondito. Some said
parts of the book were hurting the sentiments of the people. I hope after its withdrawal,
there would be no more controversies  … The decision to withdraw these parts  from
Dwikhondito is to prove that I never wanted to hurt the people’s sentiments. I hope now I
will be able to live peacefully in India and Kolkata’ (Hindustan Times 2007). Ironically, after
a court victory over the same book Nasreen commented, ‘If they had asked me to change
or delete even one word as a precondition to lifting the ban, I  would’ve gone to the
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Supreme Court. To me, changing two pages and changing one word is one and the same
thing’ (Telegraph 2007).
29 Despite this  concession and publicly giving in to the demands of  the demonstrators,
Nasreen was not  allowed to stay in India,  let  alone return to Kolkata.  She remained
incommunicado until her departure in late-March 2008 when her second exile began.
30 In India, particularly in West Bengal, Nasreen was hounded in 2000, 2004 and 2006 and
fatwas were issued against her.  Yet the government did not intervene to prevent the
recurrence of such events or to ‘appease’ those who claimed that they were speaking on
behalf of the Muslim community. For example, in March 2000 an organization named the
Reza Academy of Mumbai threatened that if she ever set foot there she would be burned
alive (Times of India 2007). In January 2004, Syed Noor-ur-Rahman Barkati of Tipu Sultan
mosque in Kolkata denounced the author in his Friday sermon, commented that ‘Her face
can be blackened with ink, paint or tar. Or she can be garlanded with shoes.’ Maulana
Rahman also offered a reward of 20,000 rupees (about 500 US dollars) to anyone who
would carry out the act. In June 2006, Maulana Barkati issued what he described as a ‘
fatwa’, after Nasreen’s speech at a conference in Kolkata. Maulana Barkati said to a local
TV channel: ‘I’ve issued a fatwa against her. After the Jumma namaz [Friday prayers], I
said if anyone blackens her face and drives her out of India, I will give him 50,000 rupees.’
He later retracted and insisted that a fatwa cannot be issued verbally.
31 What prompted the decisive step of the West Bengal government in 2007 to address the
issue raised by the ‘outraged’ Muslim community? The answer to this question is not only
important in understanding the government’s actions but also to highlight the similarity
between the events in 1994 and 2007.
32 Like with the situation in Bangladesh in 1994 we need to delve deep into other events
connected to the larger political scene of West Bengal politics to find an explanation for
the  actions.  In  a  textbook  copy  of  the  incident  in  Bangladesh,  the  West  Bengal
government first banned her book, Dwikhondito (Split in Halves) in 2004 and thus created
an environment to move against her should that become necessary. The ban was later
rescinded by the Indian court.
33 The 2007 episode, on the part of the agitators, began in March when Taqi Raza Khan of
the All India Ibtehad Council, issued a fatwa against Taslima, threatening to kill her. Khan
offered  an  inducement  of  500,000  rupees  (11,760  US  dollars)  for  anyone  who  would
behead (‘sar qalam karna’) the author. He claimed that he had the full support of the All-
India Muslim Personal Law Board (Khaleej Times 2007). The fatwa was condemned by many
Muslim representatives,  for  example,  Safia  Naseem,  member of  the All  India  Muslim
Personal Law Board, Maulana Naimur Rehman, general secretary of the Ulema Council,
and Yasef Abbas, general secretary of the All India Shia Personal Law Board to name but a
few (Times  of  India 2007a).  Detractors  of  Nasreen were looking for  an opportunity to
highlight  their  demand  and  thrust  themselves  onto  the  national  scene.  But  the
opportunity emerged because of an entirely different and unrelated set of events: the
growing resistance to the government’s plan to set up a Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
allowing a  foreign company to build a  factory in Nandigram causing the eviction of
thousands  of  hundred  of  local  residents,  who  happened  to  be  Muslims,  and  the
mysterious  death  of  a  Muslim  youth  named  Rezwanur  Rahman  allegedly  with  the
connivance of the Kolkata police.
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34 The Nandigram issue had been brewing since January 2007 when the local authority (i.e.,
the Block Development Office, BDO) announced the seizure of land. Protests and clashes
between  police  and  local  residents  ensued.  As  the  local  administration  failed  to
implement the plan, the state government viewed this as a law and order situation and
consequently decided on 9 March that it would resort to police action. The local members
of the ruling CPIM were also included in the force sent to ‘retake’ the villages. The police
action on 14 March caused the deaths of local people, incidents of rape, and complete
mayhem. However,  the local  resistance continued and the police actions,  particularly
their  heavy-handedness,  attracted national  and international  media  attention.  In  the
following months, anti-government political forces, especially the Trinamul Congress led
by Mamata Banerjee,  became involved and were effectively  trying to cash in on the
situation. But the mobilization remained, in large measure, local initiatives. The Kolkata-
based civil society was divided on the issue and very slow in responding to the on-going
locally-inspired  resistance  to  the  government  industrial  development  plan.  Between
March  and  November,  low-level  conflict  continued;  the  residents  returned  to  their
homes,  the  movement  gathered  momentum,  and  the  government  was  increasingly
becoming impatient. Finally, on 8 November, the government forcibly retook the villages.
The result was less bloody than the March events, but no less disheartening. As for the
local people, they were evicted from their homes, anyway. These events galvanized a
section of the civil society leading to a massive protest in Kolkata on 14 November 2007.
In the words of Sumit Chowdhury, this was a reflection of the ‘re-awakened conscience’.
Chowdhury states that ‘overnight, various platforms sprouted, all of which took place
without  a  political  party  or  bloc  lending  a  hand,  and  unsupported  by  any  political
ideology. This citizens’ uprising appeared spontaneous, bypassing the winding alleys of
party politics’ (Chowdhury 2008, § 2)
35 The demonstration was  followed up by  a  government  sponsored public  gathering of
hundreds and thousands of activists in support of ‘peace’ in Nandigram and the prospects
of economic development through the SEZ. The forceful demonstration of the power of
pro-government civil society at the heart of the city showed that the issue was far from
over. The two public gatherings also revealed that the religious identity of the victims
was irrelevant to the issue at hand. But behind the scenes an issue tied to ‘religious
sentiments’ was emerging, as the government suddenly banned a magazine Pathasanket
1414 on 9 November for publishing an article critical of the Bangladeshi government’s
actions against Taslima Nasreen and voicing support for her criticisms of Islamic religious
texts. The support of the ruling CPIM hierarchy for the magazine was obvious from the
list of authors, yet the state government acted quickly to proscribe it once an obscure
organization called the All India Minority Forum (AIMF) under the leadership of Idris Ali
demanded that it be banned. Morally boosted by the government’s easy capitulation, the
AIMF leaders announced an agitation program against the atrocities in Nandigram and
demanding the cancellation of Nasreen’s visa.
36 The  sudden  emergence  of  the  AIMF  and  the  government’s  inclination  towards  this
organization is interesting on two counts; first, the veracity of their claim of representing
the Muslims of the state; and second, the consequence in regard to an emerging alliance.
As for the representation issue, many Muslims of West Bengal insist the organization does
not represent them: ‘Contrary to its name, the AIMF is not found all over India, nor does
it represent all minorities. Its president, Idris Ali is known for raising emotive issues. He
was found guilty of being in contempt of the high court when he reportedly urged the
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imams  of  Kolkata  to  defy  the  court  ban  on  the  use  of  loudspeakers  for  aazan’
(Indianmuslimsblog 2007). Had the government intended to listen to the Muslim voice it
could have turned to the Milli Ittehad Parishad which brought hundreds and thousands of
coreligionists onto the streets of Kolkata on 15 November to peacefully protest against
the Nandigram incidents. As for the emerging coalition, the Nandigram issue paved the
way  for  the  creation  of  an  unprecedented  alliance—poor  Muslim  peasants  and  the
disenchanted urban intelligentsia, the mainstay of the CPIM’s support for almost three
decades.  Thus  the  hegemony  of  the  CPIM  was  being  challenged  from  an  emerging
coalition that never existed before nor had been expected to emerge. The Nasreen issue,
as presented by the AIMF, essentially cut out the roots of this emerging coalition. Two
elements of the alliance were pitted against each other—Muslims were asked to coalesce
around faith, while the urban intelligentsia was bound to stand for freedom of speech. As
the coalition began to unravel, Nasreen was shunted from city to city and then had to
leave the country.
 
Constructing an outraged community and the politics
of emotion
37 Despite the appearance that these two series of events, in 1994 in Bangladesh and 2007-08
in India surrounding Taslima Nasreen, are spontaneous emotional outbursts of a segment
of society, there is more to it. They are not fleeting reactions to events or ideas or even a
moral panic8 but the product of a community primarily guided by the politics of emotion.
It is important to note the longevity of the controversy: these two series of events took
place 14 years apart.  This debate could re-emerge at different times and at different
places because, in part, of the physical presence of the author; but also because of the
instrumentalization of  emotion by  non-state  actors  and the  state’s  connivance  in  it.
Essentially, in Bangladesh and India (particularly West Bengal) the outraged communities
were constructed through a variety of ways. An outraged community is no different from
any  other  collective  identity  created  through  deliberate  efforts.  James  Jasper,  citing
Gamson’s study of 1995 (Gamson 1995) reminded us that ‘collective labels are necessary
for action, even though they are largely fictional’ (Jasper 2006: 26).9
38 This argument requires an explanation of how an outraged community is constructed and
what  the  ‘politics  of  emotion’  means.  The  construction  of  an  outraged  community
requires a combination of a few elements. Objective conditions aside, inventing an ‘Other’
is a prerequisite for rallying a group of people. The invention of the Other means that the
group  needs  to  be  assigned  an  identity  and  differences  with  the  Other  are  to  be
highlighted. The most immediate step in this direction is to create a binary division—us
versus them, or in the words of Peter du Perez, constructing ‘identity frames’—which
maintain each other (Du Perez 1980: 3). Not only are they emphasized but the differences
are given a new meaning in the current context. The Other is characterized as demonic
and powerful. Whether the outraged community is a localized entity or a nation makes
very  little  difference  in  regard  to  such  characterization.10 Within  this  frame  of
explanation the Other does not deserve sympathy, for it is powerful and a perpetrator.
Demonization of the Other also makes it morally imperative to oppose it; and thereby
makes it larger than the issue at hand.
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39 In both instances, Taslima Nasreen was the constructed ‘Other’. In the case of Bangladesh
the  Islamists  constructed  Nasreen  as  the  symbol  of  the  ‘demonic  Other’  who  had
challenged  the  faith  of  the  Muslim  community  and  the  Bangladeshi  identity.  The
pamphlets and speeches of the detractors of Nasreen insisted on several aspects of the
‘Other’—the  apostate,  the  atheist,  the  westernized,  the  agent  of  the  Hindus,  the
transgressor, to name but a few. Both her writings and personal life were highlighted at
once. Her writing style (that is, writing in first person) was helpful to the agitators as they
insisted that her writings and she are same. Her opponents insisted that she represented
moral  decadence  and  was  an  affront  to  Islam,  as  an  author  and  as  an  individual.
Therefore,  it  was  not  Nasreen  alone  they  were  fighting  against,  although  that  was
important to them; but the enemies of Islam and the nation. This appealed to a segment
of society, because she was transformed into an issue larger than the individual.  The
issue, to some was blasphemy, to others gender transgression; to some it was her writing
that made her the demonic Other, to others it was her lifestyle. In West Bengal, in similar
vein,  Nasreen was constructed as  the instrument of  Hindutva’s  design to malign the
Muslims and Islam. The events in Bangladesh in 1994, particularly the charges brought
under Article 295A in a court of law, made it easier for her detractors to say that her
writings were a challenge to religion. The protestors’ deliberate effort to merge the issue
of atrocities in Nandigram, a Muslim majority locality, with Nasreen’s presence in the
state reveals that they wanted to make their cause larger than an individual—the Indian
state’s anti-Islamic stance.
40 Often  these  new  meanings  of  identity  as  well  as  the  construction  of  the  Other  are
connected to history, to demonstrate that the current events are not an aberration but
part of a recurrent pattern. In this context one can easily discover the presence of a
paradoxical  ‘dual  teleology’  within  the  discourse  of  the  progenitors.  The  Hindu
nationalist movement under the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its
like, commonly referred to as Sangh Parivar, is a case in point. Thomas Hansen’s fine
exploration of this movement is helpful in understanding this dualism:
On the one hand, history is invoked to justify the movement and its objectives. The
movement is but a realization of inevitable historical development, and individuals
in the movement are merely inconsequential actors in a great, unfolding drama …
On the other hand, the founding myth almost always revolves around a notion of
self-birth,  self-celebration,  depicting  the  founding  of  the  movement  in  an
extraordinary  situation  by  farsighted  individuals  who,  through  extraordinary
difficulties, succeeded in creating the present movement. Due to their intervention
the course of  history will  be  altered as  the movement will  gradually  realize  its
vision (Hansen 1999: 91).
41 The extent of this teleology varies according to the scope and nature of the events and
issues at hand, but they are not entirely absent in any instance. Thus a specific reading of
history is essential in presenting the case to the public at large and understanding the
part of the public. In the context of Bangladesh, the history was framed with the Muslim
identity as the pivotal issue as opposed to the ethnic Bengali identity. Nasreen’s writings
that  called into question the partition in 1947 provided Islamists  with the means of
portraying her as anti-Bangladesh. Interestingly, those who opposed the establishment of
independent Bangladesh became the standard bearer of the national sovereignty. The
secularists, within this frame of reference, are recast as the ‘stooges of Indian hegemony’.
To  them,  India  and  Hinduism  are  synonymous;  therefore  secularists  in  general  and
Nasreen particularly are the ‘enemy within’. The movement is an inevitable development
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of history as it is portrayed as bringing the Bangladeshi Muslims back to their roots after
a brief secularist interlude. For the protagonists, the rise of the movement was a part of
the reawakening of the Muslims. The agitators in West Bengal and other parts of India
framed the movement as the assertion of a disenfranchized minority. They claimed to be
the  voice  of  the  Indian  Muslim  community.  The  history  of  disenfranchisement  and
deprivation served as the backdrop and justification of their movement. Thus, in West
Bengal, cognitive and symbolic relationships between these two issues were established.
These movements, particularly Islamists in Bangladesh, also used global politics as an
element  of  the  history—Muslims  under  attack  from  the  Judeo-Christian  western
onslaught.
42 An important element of the construction of outraged community is personification and/
or  symbolization  of  the  issue(s).  The  person/symbol  represents  the  ‘Other’  and  the
essential negative aspects of the issues in question. In some form or the other, the central
issue is attached to a specific individual or a group of individuals; and/or symbols that
can  be  universalized.  It  is  worth  recalling  that  any  symbols  have  three  levels  of
association:  personal,  cultural  and universal.  The importance of  symbolization,  either
through a person or an object, is on the one hand to transform an abstract idea into a
tangible material, and to map an individual’s relationship with society, on the other (For
an exploration of the latter point, see Voegelin 1990). Corneliu Bjola has pointed out,
drawing on Sears (1993) and Kertzer (1988: 4), that political symbols are ‘any effectively
charged element in a political attitude object’ by which ‘we give meaning to the world
around us (…) [and] interpret what we see, and, indeed what we are’ (Bjola 2000: 9).
43 How was Nasreen, as a symbol, universalized? Her detractors pointed to the plight of the
Muslims in India, the Indian governments’ inaction and the support given to her by the
state and the secular intellectuals; these were intrinsically connected, they argued. The
loss of a moral mooring of Bangladeshi society,  brazen westernization, and Nasreen’s
writings  in  support  of  sexual  liberation  of  women  were  described  as  parts  of  one
phenomenon. The powers in play were local and global. One aspect in the discourses of
the protestors is worth recalling; that is to refer her as the ‘female Rushdie’. The analogy
was coined and frequently used by the Western press sympathetic to Nasreen to describe
her plight; but her detractors also used it to show that she was no different from Salman
Rushdie.  The Indian government’s  decision to  ban the  Satanic  Verses in  1988 was  an
impetus to Indian agitators that they can force a similar fate on Nasreen’s books.
44 It will be erroneous to suggest that the Nasreen detractors are the only ones who evoked
symbols to appeal to the masses. The evocation of symbols to relate individuals to issues
of importance is an integral part of politics in general. Political parties and states employ
symbols on a regular basis to garner support. This is called ‘symbolic politics’— that is
construction,  distribution  and  internalization  of  political  symbols  such  as  phrases,
images, norms, rules, etc. Discussions abound on the significance of ‘symbolic politics’ in
mobilizing the masses and the assumption of leadership by political elites. The seminal
studies of Murray Edelman (1985) and David O. Sears (1993) have demonstrated that the
ideational aspect plays very significant roles in political activism. Their studies have also
shown that ‘People may use political symbols simply as convenient information shortcuts
for grasping an understanding of the political environment. On the other hand, their
perceived symbolic predispositions may invite political  elites to manipulate them for
various political purposes’ (Bjola 2000: 7).
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45 Thus there are two aspects of symbolic politics: instrumental aspects and interpretative
aspects. The former deals with manipulation by the creators of the symbols while the
latter deals with how these symbols are used by the recipients.
46 The instrumental aspect of the symbols depends on the emotional intensity of recipients
towards the political symbol. The emotional involvement and intensity ‘[are] contingent
to the place occupied by the respective symbol in the dominant political discourse and/or
in that of its main competitor(s)’ (Bjola 2000: 5). But nonetheless, there remains a close
connection between the symbolization and emotions.
47 As for the interpretative aspect of symbolic politics, as I have hinted previously, a specific
reading of history insisting on a distinctive identity was crucial.  Reference to history
occupied an important position in the discourse of the leaders who gathered crowds and
mobilized them for activism. While the history varied between the Bangladesh and the
West Bengal episodes, they were never devoid of history. One key difference between the
West Bengal episode and the Bangladesh episode is the relative position of the Muslims
within the society which influenced not only how the outrage was framed and articulated
but also how the symbols  were used by recipients.  For the recipients,  in the former
instance a small organized secularist/atheist minority is insulting the religious feelings of
the  silent  disorganized  majority, while  in  the  latter  instance  the  weak  marginalized
minority’s religious rights are being trampled on by the majority.
48 The role of emotion in politics has received less than its due attention because, generally
speaking, until recently the study of political action has been dominated by the rational
choice paradigm. Within this broad framework exists a dichotomy between rational and
irrational impulses for actions, emotion falls under the latter deserving less attention
(For a succinct introductory discussion on the treatment of emotion in politics, see Jasper
2006).  But  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  two  facts:  (a)  ‘politics  always  had  an  emotional
element’; and (b) ‘a leading function of the political state is to legitimate some emotions
and differently encourage, contain and dissuade others. All political organizations in fact,
not just the state are engaged with emotions in the promotion of various dispositions,
actions and inhibitions’  (Barbalet  2006:  31-32).  Thus it  is  necessary to recognize that
emotions have been a crucial  determinant of  individuals’  and organizations’  political
actions;  but  the  vexed  question  is  how  an  individual’s  emotion  (e.g. hate,  anger,
resentment, fear, compassion) is collectivized and translated into the central element of
political actions. For making emotion the driving force of the group, individuals’ direct
experience cannot be the only means, for many may not individually experience it. It
then depends upon how the emotions are articulated and framed, and returning to our
earlier point, what symbols are used. But it is also important to note that emotions alone
cannot explain the actions of the individuals/groups; motivation for collective actions
may come from different sources.
49 The  events  of  1994  and  2007-08  demonstrate  that  in  both  instances,  symbols  were
constructed to  give  salience  to  the  politics  of  emotion.  A  new collective/community
identity was created, the Other was invented, and personification of the Other followed.
50 In the case of  Bangladesh the movement to  bring war criminals  to  justice  needed a
symbol to bring the issue to the fore. The protagonists, albeit unsuccessfully, utilized the
Golam Azam issue in this regard. While their demands had legal and political legitimacy,
they were avoided by political parties of all hues for more than two decades and thus
became a distant issue to the younger generation. The hegemony of the political parties,
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who befriended the ‘war criminals’ for political expediency, needed to be challenged from
the grassroots and through constructing a new alliance of generations cutting across the
political divide. As this alliance began to take shape, thanks to the civil society initiatives,
the supporters of the JI and the ruling BNP became uncomfortable. The anti-Golam Azam
movement also challenged the legitimacy of Islamist politics in Bangladesh. The Islamists,
therefore,  intended  to  stop  it  in  its  tracks.  This  was  achieved  through constructing
Nasreen as the symbol of the Other. The Islamists, in this instance, succeeded, not only in
creating a symbol to represent their issues but also in distracting the public from the war
criminal trial issue. Thus the Islamists not only created a rift among the community that
was being constructed by the secularists demanding the trial of the war criminals, but
also created a community which was ‘outraged’ by the comments of Nasreen. Nasreen, in
this context, was a symbol through which the world around us was given a meaning.
51 The events in 2007-08 were no different; the emerging peasant-intellectual alliance was
drawing on the politics  of  emotion as  much as  it  was building on the opposition to
globalization  and  neo-liberal  policies  of  the  West  Bengal  government.  While  for  the
protagonists  Nandigram was  the  symbol  of  resistance  to  the  SEZ,11 the  ruling  party
portrayed this as the battle-line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by.12 Despite such binary division
the emerging coalition showed no sign of breaking until a counter-symbol was inserted
into the political equation. The AIMF’s demonstration, protesting against the Nandigram
violence, added the Taslima Nasreen issue and a new symbol appealing to a different kind
of emotion was brought into the discourse.
52 The  actions  of  the  states,  in  large  measure,  have  been  explained  as  the  policy  of
appeasement  of  Islamists  and  Muslims,  respectively.  This  explanation  assumes  that
rational  behavior such as self-interest  prompted the state’s  reaction to the situation.
Indeed the increasing strength of the Islamists in Bangladeshi politics in 1994 was a factor
in how the Taslima Nasreen issue would be dealt with, but whether the same can be said
about the Indian situation is an open question. The ruling party of Bangladesh in 1994
was trying to create a schism between the JI  and the Awami League (then the main
opposition party),  as the JI  was gaining saliency within electoral politics,  particularly
after  the  new  democratic  era  began  in  1991.  The  case  brought  against  the  author
indicates  that  the  state  became  a  party  to  the  ongoing  tension;  in  so  doing  the
Bangladeshi state essentially contributed to the construction of an outraged community.
Equally important to bear in mind is that the leaders of those who were demanding the
trial of the war criminals were charged with sedition. The latter is a clear indication that
the state wanted to neutralize the outrage of the secularists in regard to the trials of the
war criminals.
53 The actions of  the Indian state,  on the other hand, cannot be explained only by the
electoral equation (i.e. the needed support of the Muslim community as a vote bank);
although that may have been a factor in the actions of the government of West Bengal
where 25 percent of residents are Muslim. The central government’s frenzied response is
far less strategic.  The demand for a trial,  the alleged attack on Muslim sensibility by
Taslima Nasreen, the unprecedented response to the Nandigram events and the demand
for  Nasreen’s  removal  from  India  were  all  framed  within  the  politics  of  emotion.
Emotions were politicized and collectivized by parties involved and the state also became
a part of it when it intervened on behalf of a party of the debate.
 
Constructing Outraged Communities and State Responses: The Taslima Nasreen Sa...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
14
In lieu of a conclusion
54 The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the similarities between the 1994 and the
2007  events  in  regard  to  the  Taslima  Nasreen  issue;  described  the  responses  of  the
Bangladeshi  and  the  Indian  states;  and  discussed  the  modalities  of  construction  of
outraged communities. The paper also demonstrated that the events surrounding Taslima
Nasreen—played out in two countries and at two different times—have implications not
only for the day-to-day politics of these two countries but also for our understanding of
how emotions are instrumentalized and how symbols are created for mobilization of
outraged communities. The actions of these outraged communities cannot be explained
by looking only at the dynamics of the group and methods of collectivization of emotion
but the role of the state in the process warrants attention as well.
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NOTES
1. Nasreen has since been allowed to return to India. On her return to New Delhi on 8th August
2008, she was ‘immediately whisked off to an undisclosed location.’  On 15th October 2008 she
complied with a government instruction to leave the country.
2. In mid-1993, a government official commented to the author in a personal conversation that if
Nasreen’s trips were not covered in the press, both in Kolkata and Dhaka, the government could
have avoided these  steps.  The official  repeatedly  used the phrase  ‘trifling’  in  describing  the
passport confiscation. However, the official also suggested that some influential members of the
ruling party were pressing for action (Interview by the author, Dhaka, August 1993).
3. For  details  of  the  events  see  the  fourth  part  of  Taslima  Nasreen’s  autobiography  Sei  Sob
Andhokar (All that Darkness, in Bengali, 2004). Nasreen summarized the content in an interview
in 2004:  ‘Every day thousands started staging demonstrations against  me,  issuing fatwas one
after the other, declaring bandhs, and the government, instead of taking action against them,
turned on me, accusing me of hurting the religious sentiments of people. By then the mullahs
had begun demanding my death through hanging and instigated lakhs [hundred of thousands] of
people to take to the streets. On the one hand there was the police hunting me down, and on the
other fundamentalists were baying for my blood. My lawyer then advised me to go into hiding.
Matters had come to such a head that even if I had given myself up, I would certainly have been
killed in prison. So, I spent the next two months in hiding and darkness. The whole country was
in the grasp of fundamentalists at that time. Sei Sob Andhakar is about those two months in hiding
and it ends with my leaving the country. This is more like a documentation of the time—my
situation and the society outside. It is a documentation of how fundamentalism, with the support
of a government, can become dangerously powerful’ (Nasreen 2004).
4. In 1971, Golam Azam, then chief of the East Pakistan wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami,  actively
collaborated with the Pakistani military junta and helped organize paramilitary forces (called
Razakars and Al-Badr). In the last days of the liberation war, Golam Azam fled to Pakistan. In
April 1973, the Bangladesh government canceled his citizenship along with that of thirty-eight
others (Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 22 June 1973, part III). In 1978, Golam Azam returned to
Bangladesh with a Pakistani passport. In 1979, the Jamaat-i-Islami was revived, and Azam became
the de facto chief of the party. On 29 December 1991, the Jamaat declared Golam Azam the ameer
(chief) of the party. Within a month, eminent citizens and intellectuals challenged the election of
Azam on the grounds that Azam was a foreigner and could not head any political party under the
laws of the land. They contended that because of his involvement with the genocide in 1971,
Azam should be tried as a war criminal.  By February 1992,  the intellectuals had organized a
committee and public campaign for his  arrest  and trial.  The day before the symbolic ‘public
tribunal’ the government arrested Golam Azam and filed a case of high treason against twenty-
four persons involved in organizing the trial. The public tribunal, however, went ahead drawing
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an unprecedented crowd. A writ petition on behalf of Azam was filed within a week of his arrest.
It asked for the release of Golam Azam and challenged the premise of his arrest, denying that he
was a foreigner. Thus it became an appeal to restore his citizenship. The hearing of the writ
petition of Golam Azam began on 19 July 1992, and continued until 5 August 1992. But the case
remained  unresolved,  as  the  two  judges  failed  to  reach  a  consensus  and  rendered  separate
judgments over a period of five days. The chief justice forwarded the case to a single-member
bench of the High Court for the final verdict. The hearing on the government’s appeal to the
Supreme Court against the verdict of the High Court began on 4 May 1994.
5. Bangladesh and India both inherited a colonial law in regard to the acts of blasphemy. The
Penal code 295 and 295A deal with the issue of ‘offences related to religion’. None of them gives
salience to any specific religion, any religious texts or any religious symbols. The penalty for
‘hurting religious feelings’ is between 2 to 10 years. In Pakistan two additional sub clauses are
added—295C  and  295D—which  specifically  address  punishments  of  defiling  the  Quran  and
derogatory  remarks  about  the  Prophet  Muhammad  with  a  maximum  punishment  of  death
sentence.  Additionally,  sections  298,  298A,  298B  and  298C  are  added  which stipulates  that
members  of  the  Ahmadiyya  community  are  not  Muslims  and  their  reference  to  Prophet
Muhammad is construed as blasphemy. The JI in Bangladesh insists that Bangladesh adopts these
new sections and clauses to address ‘blasphemous acts’.
6. Taslima Nasreen made a brief visit to Bangladesh in September 1998 to see her terminally ill
mother. As soon as the news of her return became public, Islamists organized demonstrations in
Dhaka and elsewhere calling for her trial  under shariah law.  The protests  drew a handful  of
people and have had very little impact. The government headed by Sheikh Hasina of the Awami
League made no special arrangements for her safety, nor showed any sympathy to her. On 22
November, Nasreen surrendered to a lower court to face a case filed by an individual under Penal
Code 295A (offending religious  sentiment)  and she was  granted bail.  Following her  mother’s
death and further threats from small militant organizations (AFP 1999) Nasreen left Bangladesh
in January 1999. Since then her autobiographies have been banned by the government, and in
October  2002,  a  magistrate’s  court  in  a  remote  city  sentenced  her  to  a  year  in  prison.  The
government has refused to renew her Bangladeshi passport and has never allowed her to return
to the country.
7. The most obvious indication of the state government’s inclination towards removing her from
the state was the comment of the CPIM leader Biman Bose that Nasreen should be sent either to
Jaipur or Gujarat in the wake of protests against her stay in Kolkata (The India News 2007). Bose
told reporters, ‘I don’t want to speak elaborately on the role played by the Centre on Taslima
Nasreen’s stay in West Bengal. But if her stay creates a problem for peace, she should leave the
state’ (Banerjee 2007).
8. The term ‘moral panic’ coined by Stanley Cohen in 1972 is described as a response of a group of
people who consider that some behaviors are not only deviant but also a threat to societal norms
and values. It creates outrage (see Cohen 1972).
9. The fictional nature of the collective identity has been underscored in Benedict Anderson’s
classic study Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (Anderson
1991).
10. Post-9/11 xenophobia and Islamophobia in the United States is a case in point. A particular
notion of the ‘Other’ loomed large as the politics of fear that dominated the country for at least 3
years.
11. The word ‘symbol’ has been used in almost all analyses of the events of Nandigram. A quick
Google search of ‘Nandigram symbol of resistance’ generates 4,490 documents/websites in 0.26
seconds (10 July, 2008). The CPIM leadership, however, has questioned the use of the expression
‘resistance’.  For  example,  CPIM  leader  Brinda  Karat  asked:  ’Resistance  against  what?’  (Karat
2007).
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12. This binary division was at  the heart of  the argument of  the CPIM leadership,  see Karat
(2007).
ABSTRACTS
Taslima  Nasreen,  the  exiled  Bangladeshi  author,  was  forced  to  leave  India,  her  adopted
homeland,  in March 2008 after being under ‘security protection’  for months following street
agitation  against  her  writings  in  Kolkata.  The  events  between  August  2007,  when  she  was
physically attacked in Hyderabad, and March 2008, when she left the country, were reminiscent
of those in Bangladesh in 1994 which led to her departure from there. In both instances, the
states’ responses were her forced removal from the country to placate the agitators. In this paper
I analyze the events on the ground and the responses of the states. I argue that these events
demonstrate how ‘outraged communities’ are constructed, and symbols are invented to mobilize
the community. The role of state has received little attention in the extant discussions while I
contend that states bear a significant responsibility in engendering the controversy.
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